Propaganda in America: Its Nature, Effectiveness and Future

“Be not deceived: evil communications corrupt good behavior.”
- 1 Corinthians xv. 33


Although propaganda was used with great effect by some of the most horrifying and murderous regimes in history, it is not automatically evil or even inherently untrue as many Americans seem to think. In fact, America has used propaganda for great good in the world, though few know it. They are ignorant because of our failure to communicate clearly and consistently our triumphs and accomplishments which is the purview of propaganda. In order to retain our standing and power in the world, we must embrace propaganda and fully integrate it into the National Strategy and all that it entails.

What Is Propaganda?

Vagueness about the meaning of the terms propaganda and political warfare has come about because of its incorrect usage in the modern lexicon. Political warfare and propaganda have become pejorative words through their use in unjust regimes; with the result that no one knows what they mean anymore. Therefore, it becomes imperative to understand first the words’ meaning and then their purview before any meaningful evaluation of their proper usage or future as an instrument of statecraft can be made.

Propaganda is defined by the dictionary as “information, ideas, or rumors deliberately spread widely to help or harm a person, group, movement, institution, nation, etc.”[1] However, it is much more than this. Propaganda is any communication directed at a primary target to accomplish a specific goal, namely, to persuade the targets to behave as the communicator desires.

Propaganda is a broad term that encompasses political warfare and psychological operations, which are different aspects of the same thing. These terms refer to the nature of the propaganda, its goals, and the battle space in which it is used. Psychological operations are propaganda used in the context of military operations and are primarily tactical. “Psychological Warfare is a long-standing term of military art designating the employment of certain dedicated communications assets in support of combat operations.”[2]

Political Warfare, on the other hand is necessarily a more vague term because it is used to describe propaganda implemented for political and military strategy. “Political Warfare is a term that is less well established in usage and doctrine, but one that seems useful for describing a spectrum of covert and overt activities designed to support national political-military objectives.”[3]

The Relationship Between Propaganda and the Other Tools of Statecraft

Propaganda must be rooted in the actions of the other tools of statecraft. What would political communication achieve if it had nothing on which to communicate? Propaganda, like all communication, must be supported by behavior; otherwise it will be labeled as empty words and promises, and become worse than useless. “Both the history and all our experience with the instrument conclusively shows that, if it is to be effective, what a people says must be backed up by what a people does.”[4]

Furthermore, the nature of propaganda is such that it amplifies the actions of the other tools of statecraft. Coordinated and directed action can appear to be so much ill-advised flailing if it is not explained by intelligent and considered communication. More importantly, the potential benefits from actions can be overlooked if no-one takes advantage of them. For example, propagandists were not informed, and therefore not prepared for the dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. “In consequence, our propagandists faced the greatest strategic crisis of our history with no forewarning and no chance to plan what should be done for maximizing favorable effects, and to offset bad ones…”[5] In addition to showing the need for cooperation between propagandists and the agencies responsible for the other tools of statecraft, this statement highlights the nature of propaganda as an amplifier and interpreter of actions.

The Requirements for Effective Propaganda

In order for propaganda to be effective, and therefore good, it must be more than just a snappy catch phrase on a pamphlet. Like any other art, it requires patience and ability, but even more than these it needs a well thought-out goal, a specific target, credibility, a means of communication, and most importantly, integration into a larger strategic plan whose objective is to achieve national policy goals. These are the standards by which the following cases will be analyzed.

“One of the first and most important rules of propaganda [is to] be absolutely clear about [your] objective.”[6] It is absurd to disseminate propaganda without a clear idea of what its purpose is. Is the aim to get soldiers to surrender? Do you want to bolster your allies’ flagging morale? If the question of the goal of the propaganda is not answered sufficiently, then your attempts are neutralized before they even begin.

Once a propagandist has a firm idea of what he would like to do, he must then decide to whom he desires to do it. “This also points out…another of the important ground rules of propaganda: a clear idea and knowledge of the target which is being aimed at.”[7] Without a clear and distinguished target propaganda will be ineffective, because a message must be tailored to the audience in order for it to be influential.

Credibility is the next perquisite for effective propaganda. While the propagandist may have picked out a vulnerable audience and a worthwhile aim, it will do him no good if no one will listen. “The message that he [the propagandist] is trying to get to his target must carry credibility. If it does not, he is not likely to win his target’s attention or, should he have won it, retain it for very long.”[8] Propaganda must be more than clever, it must be believable.

In the past, propagandists were limited to pamphlets, rumors and, later on, radio. Now, telecommunications technology is much more advanced. However new the technology is, the principle remains the same; a propagandist always must have some way of contacting his audience.[9]

Cooperation and Integrated Strategy are the Most Important Aspects of Effective Propaganda

While the preceding requirements are essential to good propaganda, integration of propaganda into a coordinated strategy with the other tools of statecraft is the most important aspect of effective propaganda. Included within this is cooperation between propaganda and its allies, both with the other tools of statecraft as well as national resources. However well propaganda may be worded, or as widespread as it may be, if it is not integrated into a strategy, then it will almost certainly cause more harm them good.

The tools of statecraft exist to empower a nation to achieve its national goals.[10] However, the disparate natures of the tools do not lend themselves to natural cooperation towards an agreed-upon direction. If they are allowed to go their own ways, then they will most certainly pursue their own objectives, and, in the process hinder each other and subvert the larger strategic plan. Therefore, propaganda must both be in tune with national objectives and its fellow tools of statecraft. “The allegiance political communication owes, and must owe, is to the over-all national policy, not merely its military aspect…Political Communication [propaganda] is a curiously intricate and continuous process requiring the utmost teamwork if it is to be effective.”[11]

There are many examples of propaganda being both effectively and ineffectively applied. However, there are three that stand out as being ideal cases for examination. The first is an instance where the most important rules were broken, leaving the propagandist’s nation worse off than before. The last two illustrate the power and value of well-planned and executed propaganda that is in line with National Policy.

Case 1: German Propaganda on the British Blockade in World War I[12]

In 1916, the blockade by British forces against the Entente powers, specifically Germany, was starting to take a significant toll. In fact, food had become so scarce that there were “meatless days, fresh vegetables had to be rationed and so had butter and milk, even for the young.”[13]

Up until this point, Germany had refrained from its earlier use of unrestricted submarine warfare because of the negative political effects. Due to the increased shortages however, the German High Command was seriously considering a return. The downside of this policy was that it might provoke already neutral countries into the war. The dilemma was how to re-instate the old U-boat policy while keeping new belligerents placated.[14]

Count Bernstorff had the answer: show the Americans the hardships the German people, and particularly the children, were facing. “[Showing America the shortages] was the only way in which to justify in American eyes a return to unrestricted U-boat warfare on the part of the Germans.”[15] So the Count gathered up journalists of all political and economic stripes and shipped them to Germany “to report on the sufferings inflicted on children in Germany as a result of the British naval blockade.”[16]

Unbeknownst to him, the Berlin War Ministry was organizing a tour of a different set of American journalists. Its purpose was to prove that “Britain’s naval blockade was having no appreciable effect on Germany’s food supply; in fact that as a result of the blockade the diet of children was more balanced and healthier than it had ever been before.”[17]

When Count Bernstorff found out about the other tour, he cancelled his own, wasting a valuable opportunity to persuade the Americans about the necessity of the unpopular German strategy. Due to this failure, America entered the war on the Allies side two months after the re-establishment of unrestricted U-boat warfare.[18]

The most egregious error that the Germans made in this case was not cooperating with one another. If they had an integrated strategy, and were communicating with one another about it, then such an obvious (yet disastrous) conflict of goals and messages would not have occurred. “Experienced authorities in this field are unanimous in concluding that there should be close and frequent interchange between the makers of national policy and those who will be responsible for explaining and interpreting the significance of the policy.”[19]

A second error was made in choosing the means of communication. The German High Command’s choice to target the British for their propaganda by means of American journalists was nonsensical. The logistics of it, considering the state of technology at the time, approach the impossible. How would the British even know what the Americans had seen? And, as the author points out, American news articles are written for American sensibilities, not British.[20]

If the German High Command had thought about it, they would have easily seen that keeping America out of the war was infinitely preferable to showing the British that their blockade was ineffective. After all, the British were not only keeping supplies from reaching the mainland, they were keeping the German Navy bottled up, and no amount of propaganda (especially propaganda targeting civilians) was going to persuade them to lift it. However, if the Germans had thrown all of their efforts into explaining the absolute necessity of their return to the policy of unrestricted submarine warfare and generally trying to keep America neutral, they might have succeeded, thereby winning the war.

By taking the path they did, the German government did more harm to itself than if it had stayed silent. If they had not put out the story that the blockade was failing, then the return to submarine warfare would have looked like a necessity and would have been more forgivable. As it was, it was construed as cruel and gratuitous. The most important lesson to take away from this case is that without integrated national strategy and inter-agency cooperation, propaganda becomes ineffective and often counter-productive.

Case 2: U.S. Propaganda Efforts and the 1948 Italian Elections[21]

“The general elections in Italy in the spring of 1948 were among the most crucial of all those in postwar western Europe.”[22] At the time, the Italian Communist Party was very strong in Italy, and was considered to be the inevitable victor in the upcoming elections. The concern in America was that once the communists gained power they would overthrow the democracy and impose dictatorial control, severely disrupting the delicate balance in Europe.[23]

“Italy thus became, for about a month in 1948, the principle battleground in the cold war and the scene of a notable democratic victory.”[24] No American effort was spared to affect the outcome of the elections, with the United States government coordinating disparate agencies, businesses, foreign policy and civil institutions all for the purpose of denying the communists Italy. “American officials distributed leaflets outlining the object of the Marshall plan. Special exhibits, consisting of attractively presented photographs, statistical charts, and the like were prepared for exhibition among low income groups.”[25]

The government marshaled American business resources to influence the election, most notably the movie business. “Films, both documentaries and full-length features were employed effectively. The leading American distributors in Italy pooled their resources and cooperated with the U.S. government information personnel in giving the widest possible dissemination to selected American films on a non-profit basis.”[26]

In international politics, America made moves certain to show the U.S. in a positive light and cast the U.S.S.R in an unfavorable light. Unstinting application of The Marshall Plan to Italy was only one aspect of this effort. “The American propaganda effort was accompanied by certain moves in the field of international politics that without any question won many votes for the anti-Communist side. Noteworthy among these were the tripartite step for the restitution of Trieste to Italy and the discussion at the United Nations of Italy’s application for membership. Both put Russia in a bad light.”[27]

One of the most effective and unusual tactics used was a letter writing campaign. The government enlisted the help of various Italian-American civil institutions and the Catholic Church to help defeat the communist party in Italy. They distributed form letters that Americans would send to relatives in Italy, and, as the first Italian in America to urge the sending of the letters stated, “I started the campaign, realizing that the people of Italy would believe the truth when it was told by a brother, or friend, or a blood relative…”[28]

The definitive aspect of the campaign, however, was the massive coordination between diverse groups made possible by the opposition of both the American government and people to communism. They all gladly collaborated with the aims of the National Policy. “The Catholic Church in New York and New Jersey took up the circulation of the form letters among their parishioners. Various Italian-American organizations also participated.”[29] The benefits were immediate and definitive.

By fully committing all available assets in accord with National Policy, the United States managed to not only positively affect the elections, but did so in such a devastatingly complete way that even the term “communist” became a dirty word in Italy.[30] The Communist Party, which had justifiably high hopes for the 1948 election, was soundly defeated by the pro-American Christian Democratic Party. “Step by step as the anti-Communist parties developed their campaign, in which American propaganda played a not inconsiderable part, the Popular Front’s [Communist Party] stock sank readily. When all the votes were in, it was found that the Popular Front’s share was only about 31 percent.”[31]

This instance showcases the full scope and power of a concerted propaganda campaign. It brought together very different elements of American society, and coordinated them to one common purpose. Most importantly, it was the effective use of propaganda in a Public Diplomacy[32] campaign which would have not been possible without a clearly articulated National Policy and cooperation between the government and the American people.

Case 3: Propaganda’s Role in the Surrender of the Japanese During World War II[33]

On August 10th, after the atomic bombs were dropped on Japan, the Japanese government approached the United States with a conditional surrender offer. America, in accordance with our National Policy of unconditional surrender, refused this offer. The news of the offer and the U.S.’s refusal was disseminated throughout the world, except in one place: Japan itself.[34] “The Japanese Government’s motive was clear. So long as its own people did not know of the offer, the Tokyo Government could continue fighting, could bargain hard for its conditions, and could even back out of negotiations. If, on the other hand, the Japanese people learned of their government’s surrender offer, the fighting spirit would go out of them, and the government would find it… impossible to continue hostilities.”[35]

This presented America with a unique opportunity, and the government seized it. Working together, the State Department and the Office of War Information suggested that the news of the surrender offer should reach the Japanese people directly. A half hour later, the president approved the operation, and its implementation began immediately.[36]

The problem was one of communication. The Japanese had an effective jamming technique they used against the Voice of America, and strict punishments for those caught listening to it. While this problem might indicate the deployment of an alternative, namely a pamphlet campaign, the “difficulties were enormous”[37]. “The mere problem of preparing an appropriately worded announcement, translating it, printing leaflets by the millions, and delivering them over Japan would take days if customary procedures were followed. Short cuts had to be found.”[38]

The U.S. spared no effort in preparing and executing this propaganda campaign. The State Department, the military and the various U.S. propaganda organs worked together intensely over the course of the next twenty hours. By the end of this time, Japanese citizens were reading three million pamphlets and, for those who dared, listening to the news of the surrender proposal on Voice of America.[39] “Months later, Japanese officials confirmed that the leaflet had tied the Tokyo Government’s hands, giving it no choice but to go through with the surrender on our terms.”[40]

The previous case showed the overwhelming effectiveness, scope and magnitude of an integrated propaganda campaign; this case shows that not only can properly coordinated propaganda be large and diverse but that (in concert with other agencies and national resources) its goal can be accomplished swiftly.

The Future of Propaganda

In the modern world the smallest regional incident can become a major international issue overnight because of the increased availability of advanced communications technology. As technology gets more advanced each passing year and capable of reaching a larger audience, the employment of propaganda will become both easier and more imperative, especially for America.[41]

A consequence of advanced technology becoming so cheap and prevalent is that it has also become more democratic. A single person has the ability to broadcast himself or write about ideas on the internet, and the results are visible from anywhere there is an internet connection. As the individual’s voice becomes more pronounced, people are becoming more influential in the affairs of a nation. “The information revolution has meant that more power is in the hands of individuals: the power to communicate globally, the power to engage in international dialogue and the power to influence their leaders.”[42] The scope of propaganda, therefore, becomes almost boundless. Each person that a propaganda campaign reaches can reproduce it personally on the internet increasing the circulation and impact exponentially.

Just as any mistake in speaking is amplified by a microphone, poor propaganda will have farther reaching consequences now than in the past. The increased potential of the tool means that the guidelines for good propaganda will become even more important. In order to get the most out of the increased potential of the instrument, full integration into a strategy and access to national resources are absolute essentials. “However, as international public opinion continues to influence the success of American foreign policy objectives, an aggressive strategy and increased allocation of resources are necessary…”[43]

Conclusion

America has wasted many opportunities to advance itself and improve the world because of its unwillingness to fully engage itself in propaganda. For reasons of heritage America and her institutions are skeptical of the ethics of propaganda.[44] America can no longer afford such scruples on the matter. International politics and diplomacy has become more about image and public relations than about hard power because of the democratization of communication. If America is to be as successful in the present and in the future as it has been in the past, then we must wholly embrace propaganda and incorporate it into our larger national strategy, giving it the support and cooperation that it requires.

Endnotes:

[1] Propaganda. (n.d.). Dictionary.com Unabridged (v 1.1). Retrieved November 12, 2007, from Dictionary.com website: http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/propaganda.
[2] Lord, Carne. Barnett, Frank R., Political Warfare and Psychological Operations: Re-Thinking the US Approach (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press Publications, 1989), page xi.
[3] Lord. Barnett, Political Warfare and Psychological Operations, page xi.
[4] Dyer, Murray, The Weapon on the Wall: Re-Thinking Psychological Warfare (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1959), page 35.
[5] Dyer, The Weapon on the Wall, page 2.
[6] Roetter, Charles, The Art of Psychological Warfare (Briarcliff Manor, NY: Stein and Day Publishers, 1974), pg. 13.
[7] Roetter, The Art of Psychological Warfare, pg. 14.
[8] Roetter, The Art of Psychological Warfare, pg. 16.
[9] Dyer, The Weapon on the Wall, pg. 87.
[10] Waller, J. Michael, The Public Diplomacy Reader (Washington, DC: IWP Press, 2007), pg. 30.
[11] Dyer, The Weapon on the Wall, pp. 75-76.
[12] Roetter, The Art of Psychological Warfare, pg. 15-16.
[13] Roetter, The Art of Psychological Warfare, pg. 15.
[14] Roetter, The Art of Psychological Warfare, pg. 15.
[15] Roetter, The Art of Psychological Warfare, pg. 15.
[16] Roetter, The Art of Psychological Warfare, pg. 15.
[17] Roetter, The Art of Psychological Warfare, pg. 15.
[18] Roetter, The Art of Psychological Warfare, pg. 16.
[19] Dyer, The Weapon on the Wall, pp. 75-76.
[20] Roetter, The Art of Psychological Warfare, pg. 16.
[21] Daugherty, William E. Janowitz, Morris, A Psychological Warfare Casebook (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1958), pp. 320-326.
[22] Daugherty. Janowitz, A Psychological Warfare Casebook, pg. 320.
[23] Daugherty. Janowitz, A Psychological Warfare Casebook, pg. 320.
[24] Daugherty. Janowitz, A Psychological Warfare Casebook, pg. 320.
[25] Daugherty. Janowitz, A Psychological Warfare Casebook, pg. 321.
[26] Daugherty. Janowitz, A Psychological Warfare Casebook, pg. 321.
[27] Daugherty. Janowitz, A Psychological Warfare Casebook, pg. 322.
[28] Daugherty. Janowitz, A Psychological Warfare Casebook, pg. 322.
[29] Daugherty. Janowitz, A Psychological Warfare Casebook, pg. 322.
[30] Daugherty. Janowitz, A Psychological Warfare Casebook, pg. 325.
[31] Daugherty. Janowitz, A Psychological Warfare Casebook, pg. 320.
[32] Cull. Culbert. Welch, Propaganda and Mass Persuasion, p. 327
[33] Barrett, The Truth is Our Weapon, pp. 12-14.
[34] Barrett, The Truth is Our Weapon, pg. 12.
[35] Barrett, The Truth is Our Weapon, pg. 12.
[36] Barrett, The Truth is Our Weapon, pg. 12-13.
[37] Barrett, The Truth is Our Weapon , pg. 13.
[38] Barrett, The Truth is Our Weapon , pg. 13.
[39] Barrett, The Truth is Our Weapon , pg. 14.
[40] Barrett, The Truth is Our Weapon , pg. 14.
[41] Waller, The Public Diplomacy Reader, pg. 388.
[42] Waller, The Public Diplomacy Reader, pg. 388.
[43] Waller, The Public Diplomacy Reader, pg. 389.
[44] Dyer, The Weapon on the Wall, pp. 75-76.